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Abstract
The key assumption in regression discontinuity analysis is that the distribution of
potential outcomes varies smoothly with the running variable around the cutoff. In
many empirical contexts, however, this assumption is not credible; and the running
variable is said to be manipulated in this case. In this paper, we show that while
causal effects are not point identified under manipulation, one can derive sharp bounds
under a general model that covers a wide range of empirical patterns. The extent of
manipulation, which determines the width of the bounds, is inferred from the data in
our setup. Our approach therefore does not require making a binary decision regarding
whether manipulation occurs or not, and can be used to deliver manipulation-robust
inference in settings where manipulation is conceivable, but not obvious from the data.
We use our methods to study the disincentive effect of unemployment insurance on
(formal) reemployment in Brazil, and show that our bounds remain informative, despite
the fact that manipulation has a sizable effect on our estimates of causal parameters.
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1. Introduction
In a regression discontinuity (RD) design, treatment assignment is determined by whether a
special covariate, the running variable, falls to the left or the right of a fixed cutoff value.
The treatment’s average causal effect among units at the cutoff is then identified by what
effectively amounts to a comparison of the average outcomes (and treatment probabilities,
in the case of a fuzzy design) of units in small neighborhoods on either side of the cutoff.
The key assumption for the validity of such an analysis is that the distribution of units’
potential outcomes varies continuously with the running variable around the cutoff, because
this ensures that the only systematic difference between units that are close to but on different
sides of the cutoff is their treatment assignment.
Continuity of the potential outcome distribution given the running variable, however, may
not be a credible assumption in many empirical settings where the running variable is not
exogenously determined. Consider, for instance, studying the effect of a program that offers
financial aid to students who score above a certain threshold on a test. Since the program
affects incentives, it likely affects the running variable, i.e., test scores. This fact alone does
not invalidate the key identifying assumption for an RD analysis, and published empirical
papers in which the running variable is not exogenous abound in the literature (e.g., Solis,
2017). Problems arise in such settings if, for instance, students whose score came up short
bargain with their teacher for extra points, or teachers might proactively give extra points
to certain students with scores below the threshold. If the potential outcomes of students
who become eligible for financial aid through such channels differ from those of the overall
student population close to the cutoff, a conventional RD analysis is generally biased.1
Using now standard terminology, we refer to all setups in which such violations occur as RD
designs with a manipulated running variable.2 The practical importance of this issue is widely
recognized in the literature. Following McCrary (2008), who argues that a jump in the density
of the running variable at the cutoff is a strong indication of manipulation, it has become
common empirical practice to test for the presence of such a jump. If the corresponding null
hypothesis is not rejected, researchers typically proceed with their RD analysis under the
assumption that continuity of the potential outcome distribution is satisfied. In contrast,
the cutoff is often no longer used for inference on treatment effects if the null hypothesis is
1Evidence for violations of the continuity condition on the distribution of potential outcomes has been
documented in many contexts. See, among many others, Urquiola and Verhoogen (2009), Camacho and
Conover (2011), Scott-Clayton (2011), Card and Giuliano (2014), or Dee, Dobbie, Jacob, and Rockoff (2019).
2This terminology is not unproblematic, as it can be understood as suggesting that observational units
are engaging in a form of wrongdoing. While this might be the case in some settings, there could also be
other actors within the respective institutional contexts that are violating rules, and manipulated running
variables can even occur if no rules are violated at all.
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rejected.3 This practice is problematic for at least two reasons. First, a non-rejection may not
be due to the absence of manipulation but to a lack of statistical power, e.g., due to a small
sample size. Units just to the left and right of the cutoff could still differ in their unobservable
characteristics in this case, and estimates ignoring this possibility may be severely biased.
Second, even if one correctly rejects the null hypothesis of no manipulation, the extent of the
problem may be modest, and the data may remain informative. In this paper, we propose a
systematic approach to dealing with the issue of potentially manipulated running variables in
RD designs, which addresses both of these concerns.
We begin by laying out a simple yet general model that posits the existence of two
unobservable types of units: always-assigned units, for which the realization of the running
variable is always on one side of the cutoff (normalized to be the right side); and potentially-
assigned units, for which the standard assumptions of an RD design are valid. The standard
RD framework is a special case of our model in which always-assigned units are absent. This
setup is able to capture a wide range of empirical scenarios of manipulation by appropriately
assigning the two labels to specific groups of units. The only substantial requirement is that
manipulation of the running variable occurs through a form of “one-sided” selection.
We then pursue a partial identification approach (e.g., Manski, 2003, 2009) that avoids
making a binary decision about whether the RD design is affected by manipulation (i.e.,
whether always-assigned units are present). Instead, we let the data decide about the extent
and “worst case” impact of the issue. This line of reasoning leads to bounds on causal
parameters in two steps. First, we use the magnitude of the discontinuity in the density of the
running variable at the cutoff to identify the proportion of always-assigned units among all
units close to the cutoff. Second, we use this information to bound treatment effects by finding
those “worst case” scenarios in which the distribution of outcomes among always-assigned
units takes its “highest” and “lowest” feasible value (in a stochastic dominance sense). For
sharp RD designs, the bounds are simply obtained by trimming the tails of the outcome
distribution among units just to the right of the cutoff.4 For fuzzy RD designs, the bounds are
more elaborate in structure due to the various shape restrictions implied by our model. As
extensions of our main results, we show that the bounds can be sharpened by using covariate
3Some studies also rely on ad-hoc “fixes.” For instance, a “doughnut-hole” approach is sometimes used
in the existing literature to estimate causal parameters in cases of potential manipulation. This method
excludes observations around the cutoff somewhat heuristically, and then relies on extrapolation outside the
range of the remaining data to recover estimates of treatment effects at the cutoff for a population of units
that may or may not be actually observed at the cutoff under any circumstances. As we discuss below, this
approach is problematic in several ways and goes against the spirit of the usual RD identification argument.
4This result shares similarities with that of Horowitz and Manski (1995) or Lee (2009); and some applied
papers have used heuristic arguments to arrive at some version of this strategy (e.g., Card, Dobkin, and
Maestas, 2009; Sallee, 2011; Anderson and Magruder, 2012; Schmieder, von Wachter, and Bender, 2012). Our
contribution with regard to the sharp design is thus mainly to formalize this approach.
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information, or by imposing further assumptions about the behavior of economic agents. We
also show that one can identify the distribution of covariates among always-assigned and
potentially-assigned units at the cutoff, which is helpful to characterize these groups.
To implement our identification results in practice, we describe computationally convenient
sample analogue estimators of our bounds, and confidence intervals for the causal parameters
of interest based on recent methods from the literature on set inference (e.g., Imbens and
Manski, 2004; Stoye, 2009; Andrews and Soares, 2010). Software packages that implement
our methods in R and Stata are available on the authors’ websites. Our confidence intervals
provide reliable inference on treatment effects in cases where manipulation clearly occurs.
However, they are also valid in applications where it seems unclear whether the standard RD
assumptions are satisfied, and we recommend their use in such settings in order to ensure
that inference is robust against the possibility of manipulation.
Lastly, we illustrate the use of our approach through a study of the effect of unemploy-
ment insurance (UI) around an eligibility cutoff in Brazil. We find significant evidence of
manipulation and selection at the cutoff, and our bounds imply that the magnitude of naïve
RD estimates may be heavily affected by selection. Nevertheless, we are able to infer that UI
takeup increases the covered UI duration by at least 35.4 days or at least .236 month per
month of potential UI duration. This estimate is almost twice as large as estimates around
another discontinuity, and thus for another group of workers, in Brazil (Gerard and Gonzaga,
2016). Behavioral responses to UI benefits are thus relatively large in our sample.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our general framework
for RD designs with a manipulated running variable. Section 3 contains our main partial
identification results, and Section 4 discusses estimation and inference. Section 5 presents
our empirical application. Section 6 concludes. Proofs and additional material can be found
in appendices and the supplemental materials. Throughout the paper, we use the notation
that g(c+) = limx↓c g(x) and g(c−) = limx↑c g(x) for a generic function g(·). We also follow
the convention that whenever we take a limit we implicitly assume that this limit exists and
is finite. Similarly, whenever an expectation or some other moment of a random variable is
taken, it is implicitly assumed that the corresponding object exists and is finite.
2. Model and Parameters of Interest
In this section, we introduce a general model for RD designs in which manipulation possibly
occurs, discuss its applicability, and clarify the interpretation of the parameters of interest.
2.1. Model. The general structure of the data is the same as in conventional RD designs
in our setup. We observe independent data points (Xi, Yi, Di), i = 1, . . . , n, where Xi is the
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running variable, Yi is the outcome of interest, and Di is the actual treatment status, with
Di = 1 if unit i receives the treatment, and Di = 0 otherwise. Units are assigned to the
treatment group if Xi ≥ c for some fixed cutoff value c. Our RD design is said to be sharp if
Di = I(Xi ≥ c), and said to be fuzzy otherwise.
The main structural feature of our model is that the population under study can be
partitioned into two groups with membership indicated by an unobservable dummy variable
Mi ∈ {0, 1}. In a sense made precise below, units with Mi = 0, which we call potentially-
assigned, behave as prescribed by a standard RD framework, while units with Mi = 1, which
we call always-assigned, are only restricted to have realization of the running variable on
one side of the cutoff (which we normalize to be the right side without loss of generality).
Potentially-assigned units also have potential outcomes Yi(d), for d ∈ {0, 1}, corresponding
to the outcome unit i would have experienced had it received treatment d; and potential
treatment states Di(x), for x ∈ supp(Xi), corresponding to the treatment status unit i would
have experienced if the value x had been used to determine its treatment assignment. For
potentially-assigned units we thus have Yi = Yi(Di) and Di = Di(Xi), respectively, and we
also put D+i = Di(c+) and D−i = Di(c−). Always-assigned units are not even required to
have potential outcomes and treatment states. Manipulation then exists in this setup by
definition whenever always-assigned units exist in the population. The exact behavior of the
units is restricted through the following three assumptions.
Assumption 1. (i) P(D = 1|X = c+,M = 0) > P(D = 1|X = c−,M = 0); (ii) P(D+ ≥
D−|X = c,M = 0) = 1; (iii) P(Y (d) ≤ y|D+ = d1, D− = d0, X = x,M = 0), E(Y (d)|D+ =
d1, D− = d0, X = x,M = 0) and P(D+ = d1, D− = d0|X = x,M = 0) are continuous in x at
c for d, d0, d1 ∈ {0, 1} and all y; (iv) FX|M=0(x) is differentiable in x at c, and the derivative
is strictly positive.
This assumption implies that the standard conditions from the RD literature are satisfied
among potentially-assigned units.5 Assumption 1(i)–(iii) impose, respectively, a non-zero
first stage, a monotonicity or “no defiers” condition, and a key continuity condition which
requires the distributions of potential outcomes and potential treatment states to be the
same on both sides of the cutoff. Note that Assumptions 1(i)-(iii) simplify to the condition
that E(Y (d)|X = x,M = 0) is continuous in x at c for d ∈ {0, 1} for the special case of a
sharp RD design. Assumption 1(iv) ensures that there are potentially-assigned units close to
5We formalize the notion of a RD design in terms of continuity conditions on the distributions of potential
outcomes and treatment states as in Frandsen, Frölich, and Melly (2012), Dong (2018) or Bertanha and
Imbens (2019). This leads to the same identification results as directly imposing the local independence
condition that the treatment effect is independent of the treatment status conditional on the running variable
near the cutoff, as in Hahn, Todd, and Van der Klaauw (2001).
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the cutoff on either side, which is crucial for any identification argument based on comparing
units just to the left and right of the cutoff.
Assumption 2. The derivative of FX|M=0(x) is continuous in x at c.
This is a weak regularity condition on the distribution of the running variable among
potentially-assigned units. Together with Assumption 1(iv), it implies that the density of Xi
among potentially-assigned units is smooth and strictly positive over some open neighborhood
of c. Continuity of the running variable’s density around the cutoff is a reasonable condition
in applications, and is generally considered to be an indication for the absence of manipulation
in the applied literature (Lee, 2008; McCrary, 2008).
Assumption 3. (i) P(X ≥ c|M = 1) = 1, (ii) FX|M=1(x) is right-differentiable in x at c.
Assumption 3 is the only restriction we impose on always-assigned units. Its first part
implies that the running variable only takes on values to the right of the cutoff among these
units. This (local) one-sided manipulation assumption is key for the identification argument
in the next section as it allows us to identify the proportion of always-assigned units among
all units close to the cutoff. The second part rules out that the running variable is exactly
equal to the cutoff value for some (or all) always-assigned units. If this was the case, one could
easily identify the units who are problematic for the validity of the RD design through their
value of the running variable, and simply remove them from the analysis. Finally, together
with Assumption 2, Assumption 3 also implies that the running variable is continuously
distributed in the full population, with a density that is potentially discontinuous at c.
2.2. Discussion. Our model is able to capture a wide range of empirical scenarios in which
validity of the standard RD design could be achieved by excluding a group of problematic
units just to the right of the cutoff from the data. As an example, suppose students need to
achieve a certain test score in order to be admitted to a prestigious school. The test is taken
by all students, even those who do not plan to attend the prestigious school (e.g., because
tuition is too high), and those who would be admitted even if their score falls below the
cutoff (e.g., because of legacy admissions). After a preliminary round of grading, the teacher
decides to “bump up” the scores of those students below the admission cutoff to some value
above the cutoff if she believes that the student would highly benefit from attending the
prestigious school. We then only observe the final score assigned by the teacher.
In such a scenario, there is manipulation as long as the teacher’s decision to “bump up”
students is related to their potential outcomes. Students whom the teacher believes would
highly benefit from attending the prestigious school are always-assigned: their final test score
is always above the cutoff, either because they were “bumped up”, or because they already
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scored above the cutoff in the preliminary round of grading. All other students are potentially-
assigned. Moreover, in this scenario the RD design is likely fuzzy for both groups, in the
sense that we can expect to see treated and untreated units among the potentially-assigned
(below and above the cutoff) and the always-assigned ones (above the cutoff).
Through similar reasoning, one can fit a wide range of settings into our model, including
settings in which no agent engages in any form of wrongdoing, by assigning the labels
of always-assigned and potentially-assigned appropriately to specific groups of units. We
illustrate this point in more detail in Section D of the supplemental materials.
2.3. Parameter of Interest. We focus on causal effects among potentially-assigned units
as our parameter of interest in this paper. Specifically, we study identification of
Γ = E(Y (1)− Y (0)|X = c,D+ > D−,M = 0).
which can be understood as the local average treatment effect for the subgroup of potentially-
assigned “compliers”, who receive the treatment if and only if their value of the running
variable Xi is above the cutoff (Imbens and Angrist, 1994). It is the natural analogue to
the full population local average treatment effect E(Y (1)− Y (0)|X = c,D+ > D−) typically
considered in RD design without manipulation, in that both capture the causal effect for
units for which the RD design is valid.6
The parameter Γ also retains a notion of policy relevance similar to the parameter of
interest in setups without manipulation. Specifically, it represents the causal effect for units
whose treatment status would change following marginal changes in the level of the cutoff.
This can be illustrated using the example from the previous subsection. If the admission
cutoff for the prestigious school increases, the teacher might still “bump up” the scores of
students she believes would highly benefit from attending. Treatment assignment might thus
only change for potentially-assigned “complier” students, whose effect is measured by Γ.
One should note that Γ is the causal effects for a population that is actually observed at
the cutoff, and not some hypothetical population that one would observe at the cutoff under
some circumstances. In particular, our approach does not require assuming the existence of a
hypothetical “true” value of the running variable that one would supposedly observe if one
could for instance “close” the institutional channel that causes manipulation. It also avoids
making assumptions about how such a “true” value and the observed value of the running
variable are related. We see this as an advantage relative to “doughnut hole” RD designs, for
example, which are sometimes used in applications where manipulation is a concern.7
6Since our model imposes hardly any restrictions on the behavior of always-assigned units, it is not possible
to derive meaningful conclusions about the causal effect of the treatment on them from observable quantities.
7Doughnut hole RD designs exclude observations around the cutoff and extrapolate trends estimated
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3. Identification
In this section, we derive our main results regarding the identification of Γ. We first state
some preliminary results, then consider the relatively simple case of a sharp RD design, before
finally analyzing the general case of a fuzzy RD design. Proofs are given in Appendix A.
We also give an overview of a number of extensions to our main identification results (e.g.,
quantile treatment effects), which are collected in Section C of the supplemental materials.
To present the results, it will be useful to have the following shorthand notation to categorize
various types of units:
C0 = {D+ > D−,M = 0}, potentially-assigned compliers;
A0 = {D+ = D− = 1,M = 0}, potentially-assigned always-takers;
N0 = {D+ = D− = 0,M = 0}, potentially-assigned never-takers;
T1 = {D = 1,M = 1}, always-assigned treated units;
U1 = {D = 0,M = 1}, always-assigned untreated units.
3.1. Preliminaries. Since it is not possible to determine whether a specific unit is of the
always-assigned or the potentially-assigned type, Γ is generally not point identified under
manipulation of the running variable. We therefore derive sharp lower and upper bounds on
this parameter for both sharp and fuzzy RD designs. Our general strategy is to first obtain
sharp lower and upper bounds, in a first-order stochastic dominance sense, on the c.d.f.s
FY (d)|X=c,C0 for d ∈ {0, 1}. That is, we derive c.d.f.s FUd and FLd that are feasible candidates
for FY (d)|X=c,C0 in the sense that they are compatible with our assumptions and the population
distribution of observable quantities, and that are such that FUd  FY (d)|X=c,C0  FLd , where
 denotes first-order stochastic dominance. Once these c.d.f. bounds have been obtained,
it follows from Stoye (2010, Lemma 1) that sharp upper and lower bounds on Γ are given,
respectively, by
ΓU ≡
∫
ydFU1 (y)−
∫
ydFL0 (y) and ΓL ≡
∫
ydFL1 (y)−
∫
ydFU0 (y).
An advantage of this approach is that, given bounds on the c.d.f.s of potential outcomes, it is
straightforward to consider quantile treatment effects as well. For notational convenience, all
results in this section are stated for the case of a continuously distributed outcome variable;
outside of the excluded range to the cutoff. The result is commonly interpreted as a causal effect for a
population that would be observed at the cutoff if the distribution of potential outcomes there would follow
its trend from outside the excluded range. This hypothetical population is often considered to be the one that
would be observed in a counterfactual in which the channel leading to a manipulated running variable was
“closed.” This interpretation requires strong assumptions regarding how manipulation occurs, and statistical
assumptions implying that extrapolation biases are small. No such assumptions are required in our case.
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we extend our results to outcomes whose distribution has mass points in Section C of the
supplemental materials.
Our analysis repeatedly uses an important intermediate quantity, the proportion of
always-assigned units among all units just to the right of the cutoff, which we denote by
τ ≡ P(M = 1|X = c+). (3.1)
While we cannot observe or infer the type of any given unit, under our assumptions we can
point identify τ from the size of the discontinuity in the density fX of the observed running
variable at the cutoff. We formally state this insight in the following Lemma.
Lemma 1. If Assumptions 1–3 hold, then τ = 1− fX(c−)/fX(c+) is point identified.
3.2. Sharp RD Designs. In a sharp RD design every unit receives the treatment if and only
if its value of the running variable is to the right of the cutoff. Since every unit just to the
left of the cutoff is potentially-assigned, the distribution of Y in this subpopulation coincides
with the distribution of Y (0) among potentially-assigned compliers (C0) at the cutoff:
FY (0)|X=c,C0(y) = FY |X=c−(y).
To bound Γ, we therefore only need to bound the distribution of Y (1) among potentially-
assigned compliers at the cutoff. Information about Y (1) is only contained in the subpopu-
lation of treated units, which contains potentially-assigned compliers and always-assigned
treated units (C0 and T1). Sharpness of the RD design then implies that P(T1|X = c+) = τ.
Since this quantity is point identified by Lemma 1, we proceed analogously to Horowitz and
Manski (1995) or Lee (2009) to obtain a bound on FY (1)|X=c,C0(y). In particular, a sharp
upper bound on FY (1)|X=c,C0(y), in a first-order stochastic dominance sense, is obtained by
truncating the distribution FY |X=c+(y) below its τ -quantile. A sharp lower bound is obtained
analogously by truncating FY |X=c+(y) above its (1 − τ)-quantile. That is, the bounds on
FY (1)|X=c,C0(y) are given, respectively, by
FU1,SRD(y) = FY |X=c+,Y≥QY |X=c+ (τ)(y) and F
L
1,SRD(y) = FY |X=c+,Y≤QY |X=c+ (1−τ)(y).
These bounds correspond to the “extreme” scenarios in which the proportion 1− τ of units
just to the right of the cutoff with either the highest or the lowest outcomes are the potentially-
assigned units. These bounds are sharp because both “extreme” scenarios are empirically
feasible. The following theorem translates these findings into explicit bounds on Γ.
Theorem 1. Suppose Assumptions 1–3 hold, that P (D+ > D−) = 1, and that FY |X=c+(y) is
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Table 1: Allocation of Units’ Types in the Fuzzy RD Design
Subset of population Types of units present
X = c+, D = 1 C0, A0, T1
X = c−, D = 1 A0
X = c+, D = 0 N0, U1
X = c−, D = 0 C0, N0
Note: See Section 2.1 for a definition of units’ types.
continuous in y. Then sharp lower and upper bounds on Γ are given by
ΓLSRD = E(Y |X = c+, Y ≤ QY |X=c+(1− τ))− E(Y |X = c−) and
ΓUSRD = E(Y |X = c+, Y ≥ QY |X=c+(τ))− E(Y |X = c−),
respectively.
3.3. Fuzzy RD Designs. In a fuzzy RD design with a manipulated running variable,
the population of potentially-assigned units might contain always-takers and never-takers
in addition to compliers, and always-assigned untreated units might exist in addtion to
treated ones. As shown in Table 1, there are thus five different types of units and four
possible combinations of treatment assignments and treatment decisions that are relevant for
our analysis. To derive bounds on the distributions of the two potential outcomes among
potentially-assigned compliers (C0) at the cutoff, we begin by introducing the following
notation for the proportion of always-assigned units among those units with treatment status
d ∈ {0, 1} just to the right of the cutoff:
τd ≡ P(M = 1|X = c+, D = d), d ∈ {0, 1}. (3.2)
We then proceed in three steps. In Step 1 and 2 we obtain bounds on the distribution of
potential outcomes under treatment and non-treatment, respectively, for the hypothetical
case in which the true values of τ1 and τ0 are known. In Step 3, we then derive our final
bounds on Γ, given that the true values of τ1 and τ0 are in fact unknown.
Step 1: Distribution of Potential Outcome under Treatment. We begin by consid-
ering bounds on FY (1)|X=c,C0 . Information about the distribution of Y (1) is only contained in
the data on treated units. From Table 1, we see that the subpopulation of treated units just
to the left of the cutoff consists exclusively of potentially-assigned always-takers (A0). The
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c.d.f. FY (1)|X=c,A0 is therefore point identified:
FY (1)|X=c,A0(y) = FY |X=c−,D=1(y).
Using simple algebra, we find that the proportion of A0 units among treated units just to the
right of the cutoff, which we denote by κ1, is point identified as well:
κ1 ≡ P(A0|X = c+, D = 1) = (1− τ) ·
E(D|X = c−)
E(D|X = c+) . (3.3)
To simplify the notation, we also define
G(y) ≡ FY (1)|X=c,C0∪T1(y).
It then follows from the law of total probability that this c.d.f. is also point identified:8
G(y) = 11− κ1
(
FY |X=c+,D=1(y)− κ1FY |X=c−,D=1(y)
)
.
The c.d.f. FY (1)|X=c,C0 can now be bounded sharply by considering the two “extreme” scenarios
in which potentially-assigned compliers (C0) are those units just to the right of the cutoff in
the subpopulation C0 ∪ T1 with either the highest or the lowest outcomes. The share of C0
units in this subpopulation is
P(C0|X = c+, C0 ∪ T1) = 1−
τ1
1− κ1
.
Given knowledge of τ1, we therefore obtain a sharp upper bound on FY (1)|X=c,C0 , in a first-
order stochastic dominance sense, by truncating the distribution G below its τ1/(1 − κ1)
quantile. Analogously, we obtain a sharp lower bound by truncating G above its 1−τ1/(1−κ1)
quantile. With some algebra, these bounds on FY (1)|X=c,C0 given knowledge of (τ1, τ0) can be
written, respectively, as
FU1,FRD(y, τ1, τ0) =
(1− κ1) ·G(y)− τ1
1− κ1 − τ1
· I
{
y ≥ G−1
(
τ1
1− κ1
)}
and
FL1,FRD(y, τ1, τ0) =
(1− κ1) ·G(y)
τ1
· I
{
y ≤ G−1
(
1− τ11− κ1
)}
,
Step 2: Distribution of Potential Outcome under Non-Treatment. Next, we consider
bounds on FY (0)|X=c,C0 . Information about the distribution of Y (0) is only contained in the
data on untreated units. From Table 1, we see that untreated potentially-assigned compliers
(C0) are never observed in isolation just to the left of the cutoff, but only together with
8The quantity on the right-hand-side of the following equation is guaranteed to be a proper c.d.f. in our
model. If that were not to be the case empirically, this would mean that our model is rejected by the data.
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potentially-assigned never-takers (N0). Given knowledge of τ0, the share of the latter type of
units, which we denote by κ0 · (1− τ0), is point identified:
P(N0|X = c−, D = 0) = κ0 · (1− τ0), κ0 =
1
1− τ ·
1− E(D|X = c+)
1− E(D|X = c−) . (3.4)
If we were to use only information from untreated units just to the left of the cutoff, we could
therefore obtain lower and upper bounds on FY (0)|X=c,C0(y) by truncating the distribution
FY |X=c−,D=0(y) below its κ0 ·(1−τ0) quantile and above its 1−κ0 ·(1−τ0) quantile, respectively.
However, such bounds are generally not sharp. This is because they correspond to “extreme”
scenarios in which potentially-assigned never-takers (N0) have either the highest or the lowest
outcomes among untreated units just to the left of the cutoff. By Assumption 1, however, the
c.d.f. FY (0)|X=x,N0(y) varies continuously in x around the cutoff, and thus these two “extreme”
scenarios might be at odds with the distribution of outcomes that we observe among untreated
units just to the right of the cutoff. Indeed, from Table 1, we see that the subpopulation of
untreated units just to the right of the cutoff also contains potentially-assigned never-takers,
together with always-assigned untreated units (U1), and their share in this subpopulation is
P(N0|X = c+, D = 0) = 1− τ0.
We can thus write the density fY (0)|X=c,N0(y) in two different ways using information from
either side of the cutoff (assuming κ0 > 0 and τ0 < 1):
fY (0)|X=c,N0(y) =
fY |X=c−,D=0(y)− (1− κ0 · (1− τ0))fY (0)|X=c,C0(y)
κ0 · (1− τ0)
and (3.5)
fY (0)|X=c,N0(y) =
fY |X=c+,D=0(y)− τ0fY (0)|X=c,U1(y)
1− τ0
. (3.6)
To be compatible with the distribution of Y among untreated units on either side of the
cutoff, any feasible candidate for fY (0)|X=c,N0(y) thus has to be such that
fY (0)|X=c,N0(y) ≤ s(y, τ0)
for all y ∈ R, where
s(y, τ0) ≡
1
1− τ0
·min
{ 1
κ0
· fY |X=c−,D=0(y), fY |X=c+,D=0(y)
}
.
This is because otherwise one of the density functions fY (0)|X=c,C0(y) or fY (0)|X=c,U1(y) would
have to take a negative value in order for equations (3.5)–(3.6) to be satisfied. The most
“extreme” feasible candidates for FY (0)|X=c,N0(y), which put as much probability mass as
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possible to one of the tail regions of the support of the outcome variable, are then given by
FUY (0)|X=c,N0(y) =
∫ y
−∞
s(t, τ0)I {t ≥ qU(τ0)} dt and
FLY (0)|X=c,N0(y) =
∫ y
−∞
s(t, τ0)I {t ≤ qL(τ0)} dt,
respectively, where qU(τ0) and qL(τ0) are constants such that∫ ∞
qU (τ0)
s(t, τ0)dt =
∫ qL(τ0)
−∞
s(t, τ0)dt = 1. (3.7)
We illustrate this construction in Figure 1. The “extreme” candidates for FY (0)|X=c,N0(y)
directly correspond to “extreme” candidates for the density fY (0)|X=c,C0(y) through the
relationship (3.5), which in turn yields the following sharp upper and lower bounds, in a
first-order stochastic dominance sense, on the c.d.f. FY (0)|X=c,C0 given knowledge of (τ1, τ0):
FU0,FRD(y, τ1, τ0) =
FY |X=c−,D=0(y)− κ0 · (1− τ0)FLY (0)|X=c,N0(y)
1− κ0 · (1− τ0)
and
FL0,FRD(y, τ1, τ0) =
FY |X=c−,D=0(y)− κ0 · (1− τ0)FUY (0)|X=c,N0(y)
1− κ0 · (1− τ0)
.
If the envelope function s(·, τ0) is a proper density these two bounds coincide, and the c.d.f.
FY (0)|X=c,C0 is point identified. There are two main scenarios in which this would be the case.
First, there exist no untreated always-assigned units just to the right of the cutoff, and thus
τ0 = 0. Second, there exist no untreated units of any type just to the right of the cutoff, and
thus E(D|X = c+) = 1.
Step 3: Bounds on Parameter of Interest. The analysis in Steps 1 and 2 shows that if
we knew the values of τ1 and τ0, sharp upper and lower bounds on the local average treatment
effect Γ would be given by
ΓUFRD(τ1, τ0) ≡
∫
ydFU1,FRD(y, τ1, τ0)−
∫
ydFL0,FRD(y, τ1, τ0) and
ΓLFRD(τ1, τ0) ≡
∫
ydFL1,FRD(y, τ1, τ0)−
∫
ydFU0,FRD(y, τ1, τ0),
(3.8)
respectively. However, these bounds are not directly feasible, as the population values of τ1
and τ0 are generally unknown. Nevertheless, the two values can be shown to be partially
identified. To see this, note that there are four logical restrictions on the range of their
plausible values. First, since τ1 and τ0 are probabilities, it has to be the case that
(τ1, τ0) ∈ [0, 1]2 (3.9)
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Figure 1: Illustration of the construction of our upper and lower bounds for FY (0)|X=c,N0
(1)$
Lq
0 0| , 0( )/( (1 ))Y X c Df y κ τ−= = −
0| , 0( )/(1 )Y X c Df y τ+= = −
(2)$
Uq
y
Notes: The solid and dotted lines represent the graph of the functions fY |X=c−,D=0(y)/((1 − τ0)κ0) and
fY |X=c+,D=0(y)/(1− τ0), respectively. The function s(y, τ0) is the pointwise minimum of these two functions.
The upper contours of the shaded areas (1) and (2) then correspond to the densities of FLY (0)|X=c,N0 and
FUY (0)|X=c,N0 , respectively, as the constants qL(τ0) and qU (τ0) are chosen such that the surface of the shaded
areas is equal to 1. Note that it is not necessarily the case that qL(τ0) < qU (τ0).
Second, by the law of total probability, it must hold that
τ = τ1 · E(D|X = c+) + τ0 · (1− E(D|X = c+)). (3.10)
Third, our monotonicity condition in Assumption 1(i) implies that
E(D|X = c+) · 1− τ11− τ > E(D|X = c
−). (3.11)
Note that this condition can be equivalently stated as τ1 < 1− κ1, and ensures that the c.d.f.
G in Step 1 is truncated at a proper quantile level. Finally, requiring the terms qU(τ0) and
qL(τ0), defined in (3.7), to be well-defined implies that∫
s(y, τ0)dy ≥ 1. (3.12)
These four conditions exhaust the informational content of our model regarding the possible
values of (τ1, τ0). Therefore the set T of candidates that satisfy these four restrictions,
formally given by
T ≡ {(τ1, τ0) : conditions (3.9)–(3.12) are satisfied},
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is the sharp identified set for (τ1, τ0). Using this result, we can now find sharp bounds on Γ
by finding those values of (τ1, τ0) ∈ T that lead to the most extreme values of the quantities
defined in (3.8).9 These bounds on Γ are sharp because they are based on assigning “worst
case” distributions of the potential outcomes to each of the six groups mentioned in Table 1
that satisfy our assumptions and are compatible with the distribution of observables.
Theorem 2. Suppose that Assumptions 1–3 hold, and that FY |X=c+,D=d (y) and FY |X=c−,D=d (y)
are continuous in y for d ∈ {0, 1}. Then sharp lower and upper bounds on Γ are given by
ΓLFRD = inf(t1,t0)∈T
ΓLFRD(t1, t0) and ΓUFRD = sup
(t1,t0)∈T
ΓUFRD(t1, t0),
respectively.
3.4. Additional Results. We present here a brief overview of a number of extensions to
our main identification results; for the sake of brevity, details are relegated to in Section C of
the supplemental materials.
Quantile Treatment Effects. Quantile treatment effects can be an attractive alternative
to average effects in applications because they are less sensitive to variation in the outer tails
of the outcome distribution. Since our identification results for Γ are based on first-order
stochastic dominance bounds on the respective conditional c.d.f. of potential outcomes,
they are straightforward to extend to quantile counterparts of these parameters, such as
Ψ(u) ≡ QY (1)|X=c−,D+>D−(u)−QY (0)|X=c−,D+>D−(u), where u ∈ (0, 1) is some quantile level.
Non-Continuously Distributed Outcomes. Theorem 1 and 2 are stated for the special
case of a continuously distributed outcome variable. This is for simplicity only, and our results
immediately generalize to the case of a discrete outcome variable, which occurs frequently in
empirical applications. Discrete outcomes do not pose any conceptual challenges, but some
care needs to be taken when defining truncated distributions.
Behavioral Assumptions. In some applications, it seems plausible that the probability of
actually receiving the treatment conditional on being eligible should be relatively high in
some appropriate sense for always-assigned units. For instance, if manipulation results from
some units making a conscious effort to locate to the right of the cutoff, they will likely want
to receive the treatment conditional on being eligible. This could be modeled for example by
assuming that always-assigned units are more likely to be treated than potentially-assigned
ones, or by assuming that all always-assigned units are treated. We show that imposing
assumptions of this kind can narrow the bounds in Theorem 2 by shrinking the set T .
9Note that under the model in Section 2.1 the set T has to be non-empty. If that were not to be the case
empirically, this would mean that our model is rejected by the data.
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Covariates. Following arguments similar to those in Lee (2009), covariates that are measured
prior to treatment assignment can also be used to narrow the bounds in Theorem 1 and 2.
The idea is that, if the outcome distribution or the proportion of always-assigned units just to
the right of the cutoff changes with the covariates, trimming units based on their position in
the outcome distribution conditional on the covariates leads to units with less extreme values
in the overall outcome distribution being trimmed. Additionally, we show that one can also
identify the distribution of covariates among always-assigned and potentially-assigned units.
This could be useful for targeting policies aimed at mitigating manipulation for instance.
4. Estimation and Inference
While our main focus in this paper is on deriving identification results for causal effects in
RD designs with a manipulated running variable, this section also discusses some methods
for estimation and inference, based on the results in Section 3.10
4.1. Estimation of the Bounds. We describe the construction of our final estimates of the
bounds on Γ for the general case of a Fuzzy RD design. Bounds for the sharp case can be
obtained in a more simple fashion. First, note that the set T is a straight line in the unit
square, and can therefore be represented in terms of the location of the endpoints of the line:
T = {(η1(t), η0(t)) : t ∈ [0, 1]} with ηd(t) = τLd + t · (τUd − τLd )
for d ∈ {0, 1}, where
τL1 = max
{
0, 1− 1− τ
g+
}
,
τU0 = min
{
1, τ1− g+
}
,
τU1 = min
{
1− (1− τ) · g
−
g+
,
τ −max{0, 1−
∫
s̃(y)dy}(1− g+)
g+
}
,
τL0 = max
{
0, τ − (1− τ) · (g
+ − g−)
1− g+ , 1−
∫
s̃(y)dy
}
,
with s̃(y) = min{fY |X=c−,D=0(y)/κ0, fY |X=c+,D=0(y)}, g+ = E(Di|Xi = c+) and g− =
E(Di|Xi = c−). Dropping the “FRD” subscript to simplify the notation, the bounds on Γ
from Theorem 2 can then be written as
ΓL = inf
t∈[0,1]
ΓL(η1(t), η0(t)) and ΓU = sup
t∈[0,1]
ΓU(η1(t), η0(t)).
This expression is convenient because it makes the area over which optimization takes place
free of unknown quantities that have to be estimated.
With this notation, estimates of our bounds on Γ can be obtained through a “plug-in”
10Our approach uses a number of different techniques that are well-understood individually, but whose
combination requires a tedious theoretical analysis. We therefore do not present any formal results here.
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approach that replaces unknown population quantities with suitable sample counterparts.
Specifically, our estimates of the lower and upper bounds on Γ are then given, respectively, by
Γ̂L = inf
t∈[0,1]
Γ̂L(η̂1(t), η̂0(t)) and Γ̂U = sup
t∈[0,1]
Γ̂U(η̂1(t), η̂0(t)),
where our software package uses grid search to solve these two optimization problems. Here
Γ̂U(t1, t0) =
∫
ydF̂U1 (y, t1, t0)−
∫
ydF̂L0 (y, t1, t0).
Γ̂L(t1, t0) =
∫
ydF̂L1 (y, t1, t0)−
∫
ydF̂U0 (y, t1, t0);
the function F̂ jd (y, t1, t0) is a sample analogue estimator of the function F
j
d,FRD(y, t1, t0) for
d ∈ {0, 1}; and η̂d(t) is a sample analogue estimator of the function ηd(t) introduced above.
The precise definition of these estimates is given in Appendix B. Following the recent RD
literature, we focus on flexible nonparametric methods, and in particular local polynomial
smoothing (Fan and Gijbels, 1996), for their construction.
4.2. Inference. In order to quantify sampling uncertainty about Γ, we construct confidence
intervals that are “manipulation-robust” in the sense that they are valid irrespective of the
true value of τ . Such a construction involves a number of complications that we describe in
this subsection. We focus again on the general case of a Fuzzy RD design in Theorem 2, as
the procedure works analogously for the sharp case.
The first conceptual complication is due to the presence of an optimization operator in
the definition of the bounds.11 We address this as follows. Suppose that for every t ∈ [0, 1]
we had a 1− α confidence interval CFRD1−α (t) for Γ that was valid if the true value of (τ1, τ0)
was equal to (η1(t), η0(t)). Then the intersection-union principle (Berger, 1982) implies that
CFRD1−α = ∪t∈[0,1]CFRD1−α (t) is a 1− α confidence interval for Γ. That is, a candidate value for Γ
is outside of CFRD1−α if and only if it is outside of CFRD1−α (t) for all t ∈ [0, 1]. Both the “fixed t”
and the overall confidence interval have level 1− α: there is no need for an adjustment to
account for the fact that we are implicitly testing a continuum of hypotheses.
We are thus left with the problem of constructing a “fixed t” confidence interval, which is
our second main complication. If the estimates Γ̂L(η̂1(t), η̂0(t)) and Γ̂U (η̂1(t), η̂0(t)) were jointly
asymptotically normal irrespective of the true value of τ , one could use the approach proposed
by Imbens and Manski (2004) and Stoye (2009) for this purpose. However, our bound estimates
are only jointly asymptotically normal (under appropriate regularity conditions) if τ > 0.
11Our problem differs from the one in Chernozhukov, Lee, and Rosen (2013), who study inference on
intersection bounds of the form [supv θ(v), infv θ(v)]. It is more accurately described as an example of union
bounds, as the role of the inf and the sup operator in the definition of the identified set is reversed.
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For τ = 0, their limiting distribution is non-Gaussian, as the estimated level of manipulation
τ̂ = max{0, 1− f̂−/f̂+}, formally defined in Appendix B, fails to be asymptotically normal.12
A Gaussian approximation to the distribution of the “fixed t” estimates is thus typically poor
in finite samples if τ is not well-separated from zero, and the standard bootstrap is unable to
fix this issue (Andrews, 2000).
We therefore propose an approach similar to moment selection in the moment inequality
literature (e.g. Andrews and Soares, 2010; Andrews and Barwick, 2012). Roughly speaking,
we estimate the limiting distribution of the estimated bounds for a level of manipulation that
is “tilted” away from zero, with the amount of tilting vanishing if τ̂ is very large relative to its
standard error. Since τ determines the extent to which certain distributions are trimmed, the
estimated bounds Γ̂L(η̂1(t), η̂0(t)) and Γ̂U(η̂1(t), η̂0(t)) are stochastically increasing in τ . By
potentially “tilting” the value of τ away from zero, we simultaneously guarantee asymptotic
normality of the bounds estimates and correct coverage of the corresponding confidence
interval. For convenience, we construct such a confidence interval CFRD1−α via the bootstrap;
the formal algorithm is described in Appendix B.
4.3. “Fixed τ” Inference. The confidence interval construction above takes a deliberately
agnostic view about the true value of τ . This view can be overly pessimistic in certain
contexts. Suppose that a researcher strongly believes that manipulation is either fully absent
or at least of negligible magnitude in a particular setting, and that this belief is confirmed by
a point estimate of τ that is close to zero. Now, if the corresponding standard error is large,
the confidence interval CFRD1−α can be rather wide, as the data by themselves do not rule out a
high level of manipulation. In such a scenario, the researcher could consider an alternative
confidence interval for Γ that is computed under the assumption that the value of τ is known
to be some specific τ ∗ ≥ 0. Such an interval C1−α(τ ∗) can be calculated through a modified
bootstrap algorithm described in Appendix B. For τ ∗ = 0, this algorithm yields the usual
“no manipulation” confidence interval, and generally C1−α(τ ∗) widens as τ ∗ increases.
To see how this is useful, suppose that the researcher’s main goal is testing the hypothesis
that Γ = 0 against the alternative that Γ 6= 0. Remember that Γ corresponds to the usual “no
manipulation” RD parameter if τ = 0 (i.e., always-assigned units are absent). The researcher
can plot the upper and lower boundary of C1−α(τ ∗) as a function of τ ∗, and check graphically
for which levels of manipulation the value of 0 is contained in the confidence interval. The
largest value of τ ∗ for which 0 /∈ C1−α(τ ∗) is then called the breakdown point of the null
hypothesis that Γ = 0 (cf. Horowitz and Manski, 1995; Masten and Poirier, 2020). For
12Under standard regularity conditions
√
nh(τ̂ − τ) d→ max{0, Z} if τ = 0, where Z is a Gaussian random
variable with mean zero.
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example, suppose that 0 /∈ C1−α(0), but that 0 ∈ C1−α(τ ∗) for τ ∗ ≥ 0.1. Then the researcher
can report that in his preferred “no manipulation” specification the null hypothesis Γ = 0
is rejected at the critical level α, and that at least a 10% level of manipulation around the
cutoff would be needed to reverse this result. The researcher can then argue why such a high
value of τ is implausible in her setting, even if it is not formally rejected by the data. We
believe that such an exercise is a useful robustness check for every RD study, including those
in which manipulation is generally not believed to be an issue.
5. Empirical Application
In this section, we apply the methods developed above to bound treatment effects of unem-
ployment insurance (UI) on (formal) reemployment around an eligibility cutoff in Brazil.
UI programs often feature discontinuities in the level or duration of potential UI benefits
based on the value of some running variable, such as age at layoff or the number of months
of employment prior to layoff. RD designs are thus natural empirical strategies to estimate
this effect. At the same time, the possibility of manipulation of the running variable is a
common concern in the UI context (e.g., Card, Chetty, and Weber, 2007; Schmieder, von
Wachter, and Bender, 2012). For instance, the net value of a match (compared to the outside
option) may decrease once workers are eligible for UI, leading to more separations (see, e.g.,
Feldstein, 1976).13 Our key identifying assumption (“one-sided manipulation”) is likely to
apply in this context, as displaced workers are likely to have a weak preference for being
eligible for UI benefits (they always have the choice to not take up UI). Moreover, in most
countries (the US being a notable exception), employers have no incentive to lay off their
workers before they become eligible for UI as UI benefits are not experience-rated.
The setting of our application is also interesting in itself. UI programs have been adopted in
a number of developing countries. Yet, the existing evidence for countries with high informality
remains limited. One reason is that the concern of manipulation around discontinuities in
potential UI benefits may be more severe in these countries, complicating the estimation of
treatment effects. The costs of being formally laid off when eligible for UI may be relatively
lower for some workers if they can work informally while drawing UI benefits.
5.1. Institutional Details, Data, and Sample Selection. Our empirical exercise focuses
on an eligibility cutoff in the Brazilian UI program. In the interest of space, we present
the institutional details and the data succinctly. For more details, see Gerard and Gonzaga
13The manipulation in our application may also be due to other types of behaviors that likely fit under our
general model in Section 2: some workers may provoke their layoff or ask their employer to report their quit
as a layoff once they are eligible for UI (Hopenhayn and Nicolini, 2009), workers laid off with a value of the
running variable to the left of the cutoff may lobby their employers to lay them off on a later date, etc.
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(2016), who study other aspects of the Brazilian UI program.
Institutional Details. In Brazil, a worker who is reported as involuntarily laid off from
a private-sector formal job is eligible for UI under two conditions. First, she must have at
least six months of continuous job tenure at layoff. Second, there must be at least 16 months
between the date of her layoff and the date of the last layoff after which she applied for
and drew UI benefits. We focus on the eligibility cutoff created by the second condition.
The 16-month cutoff is more arbitrary and thus less likely to coincide with other possible
discontinuities.14 Workers who satisfy the two conditions can withdraw monthly UI payments
after a 30-day waiting period and until they are formally reemployed or exhaust their potential
UI duration. The potential UI duration is equal to three, four, or five months of UI benefits if
workers accumulated more than 6, 12, or 24 months of formal employment in the 36 months
prior to layoff, respectively. The benefit level depends on workers’ average wage in the three
months prior to layoff. The replacement rate is 100% at the bottom of the wage distribution
but is already down to 60% for a worker who earned three times the minimum wage (see
Section E in the supplemental materials for the full schedule). Finally, UI benefits are not
experience-rated in Brazil.
Data. Our empirical analysis relies on two administrative datasets. The first one is a
longitudinal matched employee-employer dataset covering by law the universe of formal
employees. Every year, firms must report all workers formally employed at some point during
the previous calendar year. The data include information on wage, tenure, age, gender,
education, and sector of activity. The data also include hiring and separation dates, as
well as the reason for separation. The second dataset is the registry of all UI payments.
Individuals can be matched in both datasets as they are identified through the same ID
number. Combining the datasets (we have both from 2002 to 2010), we can study the effect
of UI on the time it takes for displaced formal workers to find a new formal job. Gerard
and Gonzaga (2016) show that it is the relevant outcome to study in order to measure the
efficiency cost from the usual moral hazard of UI in a context of high informality.
Sample selection. Our sample of analysis is constructed as follows. First, we consider all
workers, between 18 and 55 years old, who lost a private-sector full-time formal job between
2004 and 2008. We start in 2004 to identify workers who were displaced from another formal
job about 16 months earlier. We end in 2008 to observe two years after layoff for all workers.
Second, we keep workers who had more than six months of job tenure at layoff (the other
14For instance, six months of job tenure may be a salient milestone for evaluating employees’ performance.
Gerard and Gonzaga (2016) show evidence of manipulation around the six-month cutoff as well. This has
been confirmed recently by Carvalho, Corbi, and Narita (2017).
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eligibility condition). Third, we restrict attention to workers for whom the difference between
the layoff date and the date of their previous layoff fell within 50 days of the 16-month
eligibility cutoff. Finally, we limit the sample to workers who exhausted their UI benefits
after the previous layoff such that the change in eligibility at the 16-month cutoff is sharp.15
Our sample ultimately consists of 169,575 workers with a relatively high attachment to the
formal labor force, high turnover rate, and high ability to find a new formal job rapidly.16
These are not the characteristics of the average displaced formal employee or UI taker in
Brazil, but characteristics of workers for whom the 16-month cutoff may be binding.
5.2. Graphical Evidence. Figure 2 displays some patterns in our data. Observations are
aggregated by day between the layoff date and the 16-month cutoff. Panels A and B provide
some evidence of potential manipulation of the running variable. The density of the running
variable and the average statutory UI replacement rate (statutory UI benefit/wage) appear to
increase at the cutoff, highlighting the possibility of selection at the cutoff.17 Panel C suggests
that workers were partially aware of the eligibility rule. The share of workers applying for
UI benefits jumps at the cutoff. Panel D shows that the eligibility rule was enforced. The
share of workers drawing some UI benefits is close to zero to the left of the cutoff, but takeup
jumps to 72% at the cutoff. Eligible workers drew on average 3.02 months of UI benefits
(panel E); UI takers thus drew on average 3.02/.72 =4.19 months of UI benefits. Finally,
Panel F shows that the average duration without a formal job (censored at two years) jumps
from about 220 days to about 280 days at the cutoff. The average duration is high on both
sides of the cutoff because the distribution of this variable has a long upper tail: about 15%
of workers remain without a formal job two years after layoff (see the full distribution in
Section E in the supplemental materials).
5.3. Estimates. The discontinuity in average duration without a formal job in Figure 2
could be due to a treatment effect, but also to a selection bias. Workers on each side of the
cutoff may have different potential outcomes in the presence of manipulation. Our methods
15Workers who find a new formal job before exhausting their benefits are entitled to draw the remaining
benefits after a new layoff, even if it occurs before the 16-month cutoff. To implement this restriction, we
select workers who drew the maximum number of benefits after the previous layoff (about 40% of cases)
because we measure the number of UI benefits a worker is eligible for imprecisely in the data. We also drop
workers previously laid off after the 28th of a month. Otherwise, there is bunching in the layoff density at the
16-month cutoff even in the absence of manipulation (because February has only 28 days).
16They were previously eligible for five months of UI, so they accumulated 24 months of formal employment
within a 36-month window. They were laid off again within 16 months and had at least six months of
continuous tenure at layoff, so they found a job relatively quickly after their previous layoff (50% of workers
eligible for five months of UI benefits remain without a formal job one year after layoff).
17The replacement rate in panel B is calculated for all workers, including those who are not eligible for UI,
based on their wage at layoff and the UI benefit schedule.
20
Figure 2: Graphical evidence for our empirical application.
Notes: The figure displays the mean of different variables on each side of the cutoff by day between the
layoff and eligibility dates, and local linear regressions on each side of the cutoff using an edge kernel and a
bandwidth of 30 days. The figure is based on a sample of 169,575 displaced formal workers whose layoff date
fell within 50 days of the eligibility date.
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allow us to bound treatment effects, despite the possibility of selection effects. We present
results from using our methods in Table 2 for an edge kernel (Cheng, Fan, and Marron, 1997)
and a bandwidth of 30 days around the cutoff.18 For bounds in the Fuzzy RD case that
involve numerical optimization, we use a grid search to look for the infimum and supremum
using 51 values for t ∈ [0, 1]. Confidence intervals are based on 500 bootstrap samples.19
Panel A reports estimates of key inputs for our bounds. First, the increase in the density
documented in panel A of Figure 2 is estimated to reach 6.4% and to be statistically different
from zero at conventional levels.20 This implies that always-assigned units account for
τ = 6.4% of observations just to the right of the cutoff. The value of τ appears well-separated
from zero, so the safeguards that ensure uniform validity of the confidence intervals for our
bounds in case of small and imprecisely estimated values of τ are of no practical importance
here. Second, UI takeup is estimated to increase by 70.6%-points at the cutoff.
Panels B-D then report the results from two types of exercises. First, we consider a
Sharp RD design (SRD), in which UI eligibility is defined as the treatment. The causal
effect on the outcome can be interpreted as an intention-to-treat (ITT) parameter in this
case. Second, we consider the Fuzzy RD design (FRD) with UI takeup as the treatment. In
each case, we display both Naïve RD estimates that assume no manipulation and estimates
of our bounds for the treatment effects. We present results for the average effect on the
duration without a formal job censored at 6 and 24 months after layoff in panels B and C,
respectively. The 6-month duration proxies for the covered UI duration (up to 5 months
after a 30-day waiting period); Gerard and Gonzaga (2016) show that the increase in the
covered duration caused by changes in benefits is the main source of efficiency cost for UI
programs. Considering both the 6-month and 24-month durations allows us to illustrate how
our bounds for average treatment effects are affected by long tails in the distribution of the
outcome variable. Relatedly, we present results for the estimated effects at the median using
the outcome censored at 24 months after layoff in panel D, which allows us to illustrate the
usefulness of looking at quantile treatment effects, as these are rather insensitive to long tails.
Naïve RD estimates that assume no manipulation yield an average increase in the duration
without a formal job from UI eligibility (SRD) of 29.4 and 61.9 days for censoring points of 6
and 24 months, respectively. The corresponding figures are 41.6 and 87.7 days for the effect
of UI takeup (FRD). For the duration censored at 24 months, naïve treatment effects at the
18We do not have theoretical results on the optimal bandwidth for the estimation of our bounds. Our
estimates are similar if we use bandwidths of 10 or 50 days around the cutoff (available upon request).
19Due to the censoring of the outcome variable, we use identification results for non-continuously distributed
outcomes described in Section C in the supplemental materials.
20The increase in the average statutory UI replacement rate in panel B of Figure 2 is also statistically
different from zero at conventional levels (see Section E in the supplemental materials), highlighting the
possibility of selection.
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Table 2: Estimated treatment effects of UI on the duration without a formal job
Estimate 95% CI
A. Basic Inputs
Share of always-assigned workers 0.064 [0.038; 0.089]
Increase in UI takeup at the cutoff 0.706 [0.697; 0.714]
B. Average effect: duration without a formal job censored at 6 months
ITT/SRD: Ignoring manipulation 29.4 [27.6; 31.2]
ITT/SRD: Bounds for Γ [26.4; 38.7] [24.6; 42.3]
LATE/FRD: Ignoring manipulation 41.6 [39.2; 44.0]
LATE/FRD: Bounds for Γ [35.7; 51.3] [33.4; 55.1]
C. Average effect: duration without a formal job censored at 24 months
ITT/SRD: Ignoring manipulation 61.9 [55.7; 68.1]
ITT/SRD: Bounds for Γ [31.4; 80.9] [18.9; 89.6]
LATE/FRD: Ignoring manipulation 87.7 [79.1; 96.2]
LATE/FRD: Bounds for Γ [47.2; 108.1] [30.5; 118.5]
D. Median effect: duration without a formal job censored at 24 months
ITT/SRD: Ignoring manipulation 86 [80.8; 91.2]
ITT/SRD: Bounds for Γ [75; 98] [68.9; 105.4]
LATE/FRD: Ignoring manipulation 99 [91.0; 107.0]
LATE/FRD: Bounds for Γ [70; 119] [56.3; 128.5]
Notes: Total number of observations within our bandwidth of 30 days around the cutoff: 102,791 displaced
formal workers. Confidence intervals have nominal level of 95% and are based on 500 bootstrap samples.
median are larger, at 86 days (SRD) and 99 days (FRD). The median worker is reemployed
within a year, and is thus more likely to respond to UI given the short potential UI duration.
A few points are useful to highlight for the behavior of our bounds in this application.
First, the bounds for the average treatment effects among potentially-assigned units (Γ)
are relatively tight for the duration without a formal job censored at 6 months after layoff.
The lower bounds, in particular, are close to the naïve RD estimates, with point estimates
of 26.4 days (SRD) and 35.7 days (FRD). Second, the bounds for the average treatment
effects become wider on both sides of the naïve estimates when we consider higher censoring
points. This difference comes from the fact that the distribution of the outcome becomes
more dispersed and has less probability mass at the censoring point when we increase the
censoring threshold. Third, bounds for quantile treatment effects, which are less sensitive to
tails of the outcome distribution, can be tighter than bounds on average treatment effects in
these cases. When we censor the outcome at 24 months, we obtain bounds for the average
treatment effect between 31.4 and 80.9 days, but between 75 and 98 days for the treatment
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Figure 3: Fixed-manipulation inference for our empirical application
Notes: The figure displays point estimates of our bounds and confidence intervals for the respective parameter
of interest under fixed levels of the degree of manipulation. We consider LATE/FRD estimates for the
average treatment effect and the quantile treatment effect at the 50th percentile for the outcome censored
at 24 months. The solid vertical line (resp. dashed vertical lines) corresponds to our point estimate (resp.
confidence interval) for the extent of manipulation (see Table 2).
effect at the median (SRD; the bounds are also tighter in the FRD case).
Finally, we illustrate the alternative strategy for inference that we recommend when
researchers have strong beliefs that manipulation is unlikely in their setting. After all, it is
not obvious from Figure 2 that there is manipulation in our data. Figure 3 displays point
estimates and confidence intervals for our bounds in the Fuzzy RD case for various fixed
levels of the extent of manipulation (hypothetical values of τ). Panel A shows that inference
on the average treatment effect can be quite sensitive to the extent of manipulation. The
width of the confidence intervals doubles when we assume a small degree of manipulation
(τ = .025) rather than no manipulation. This illustrates the importance of taking into account
the possibility of manipulation even when the McCrary (2008) test fails to reject the null
hypothesis of no manipulation. The width of the confidence intervals grows quickly with
larger degrees of manipulation. Panel B shows that inference on quantile treatment effects is
less sensitive to the extent of manipulation. Inference may remain meaningful, even for large
degrees of manipulation, illustrating the usefulness of looking at quantile treatment effects.
In sum, we find significant evidence of manipulation at the cutoff, and our bounds imply
that the magnitude of naïve RD estimates may be heavily affected by selection. Nevertheless,
we can still draw useful conclusions from this empirical exercise. For instance, we estimate
a lower bound for the effect of UI takeup on the duration covered by UI (i.e., the outcome
censored at 6 months) to be around 35.7 days. This corresponds to an increase of at least
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35.7/(5 · 30) = .238 month per month of potential UI duration (given a maximum potential
UI duration of 5 months). In comparison, Gerard and Gonzaga (2016) find an increase of
only .126 month in the covered UI duration per additional month of potential UI duration
among UI takers. Behavioral responses to UI benefits are thus relatively large in our setting,
which is consistent with the composition of our sample (high attachment to the formal labor
force, high turnover rate, and high ability to find a new formal job rapidly).
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we propose a partial identification approach to deal with the issue of potentially
manipulated running variables in RD designs. We show that while the data are unable to
uniquely pin down treatment effects if a running variable is subject to manipulation, they
are generally still informative in the sense that they imply bounds on the value of causal
parameters in both sharp and fuzzy RD designs. Our main contribution is to derive and
explicitly characterize these bounds. We also propose methods to estimate our bounds in
practice, and discuss how to construct confidence intervals. The approach is illustrated with
an application to the Brazilian UI program. We recommend the use of our approach in
applications irrespective of the outcome of McCrary’s (2008) test for manipulation. Software
packages that implement our methods in R and Stata are available on our websites.
A. Proofs
A.1. Proof of Lemma 1. Since the density of the running variable is continuous around
the cutoff among potentially-assigned units by Assumption 2, we have that fX|M=0 (c−) =
fX|M=0 (c+), and therefore fX (c+) = (1− P (M = 1)) fX|M=0 (c−) + P (M = 1) fX|M=1 (c+) .
Since there are no always-assigned units below the cutoff by Assumption 3, we have
fX|M=1(x) = 0 for x < c, and thus fX (c−) = (1− P (M = 1)) fX|M=0 (c−). Hence (fX (c+)−
fX (c−))/fX (c+) = fX|M=1(c+)P(M = 1)/fX(c+) = τ , where the last equality follows from
Bayes’ Theorem.
A.2. Proof of Theorem 1. The result is a minor variation of results in Horowitz and Manski
(1995) and Lee (2009).
A.3. Proof of Theorem 2. It follows from the arguments presented in the main body of
the paper that the bounds on Γ given knowledge (τ1, τ0), formally stated in equation (3.8),
are valid and sharp. That is, any value of Γ outside of these bounds is clearly incompatible
with the distribution of (Y,D,X); and every value within the bounds is feasible. Moreover,
it is clear that any value of (τ1, τ0) /∈ T is incompatible with the distribution of observable
quantities. It thus remains to be shown that any point (τ1, τ0) ∈ T is compatible with our
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model and the observed joint distribution of the data.
To show this, we proceed by constructing for any (τ1, τ0) ∈ T the distribution of a random
vector (Ỹ (1), Ỹ (0), D̃+, D̃−, M̃ , X̃) in such a way that the assumptions of our model are
satisfied, and that the distribution of (Ỹ , D̃, X̃), where D̃ = D̃+I(X̃ ≥ c) + D̃−I(X̃ < c)
and Ỹ = Ỹ (D̃), for X̃ ∈ (c − ε, c + ε) for some ε > 0, is the same as that of (Y,D,X) for
X ∈ (c− ε, c+ ε). Note that it suffices to restrict attention to an ε-neighborhood around the
cutoff because our model has no implications for the distribution of observables outside of
that range. Also note that our construction defines the notion of potential treatment states
and potential outcomes for always-assigned units. This is not a concern because our model
does not require such notions to be well-defined, but does not rule out that case either,
We now construct a distribution of (Ỹ (1), Ỹ (0), D̃+, D̃−, M̃ , X̃) for X̃ ∈ (c− ε, c+ ε). For
x ∈ (c− ε, c+ ε), let
fX̃(x) = fX(x) and P(M̃ = 1|X̃ = x) =
1− fX(c
−)/fX(x) if x ≥ c
0 if x < c.
Moreover, let
P(D̃− = 0, D̃+ = 1|X̃ = x, M̃ = 0) =

P(D = 1|X = x) · 1−τ11−τ − P(D = 1|X = c
−)
if x ≥ c,
P(D = 1|X = c+) · 1−τ11−τ − P(D = 1|X = x)
if x < c,
P(D̃− = 1, D̃+ = 1|X̃ = x, M̃ = 0) =
P(D = 1|X = c
−) if x ≥ c,
P(D = 1|X = x) if x < c,
P(D̃− = 0, D̃+ = 0|X̃ = x, M̃ = 0) = 1− P(D̃− = 0, D̃+ = 1|X̃ = x, M̃ = 0)
− P(D̃− = 1, D̃+ = 1|X̃ = x, M̃ = 0),
P(D̃− = 1, D̃+ = 0|X̃ = x, M̃ = 0) = 0,
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and
P(D̃− = 0, D̃+ = 1|X̃ = x, M̃ = 1) =
P(D = 1|X = x) ·
τ1
τ
− h(x) if x ≥ c,
P(D = 1|X = c+) · τ1
τ
− h(c+) if x < c,
P(D̃− = 1, D̃+ = 1|X̃ = x, M̃ = 1) =
h(x) if x ≥ c,h(c+) if x < c,
P(D̃− = 0, D̃+ = 0|X̃ = x, M̃ = 1) = 1− P(D̃− = 0, D̃+ = 1|X̃ = x, M̃ = 1),
− P(D̃− = 1, D̃+ = 1|X̃ = x, M̃ = 1),
P(D̃− = 1, D̃+ = 0|X̃ = x, M̃ = 1) = 0,
where h(·) is an arbitrary continuous function satisfying that 0 ≤ h(x) ≤ P(D = 1|X =
x) · τ1/τ . With these choices, the implied distribution of (D̃, X̃)|X̃ ∈ (c− ε, c+ ε) is the same
as that of (D,X)|X ∈ (c− ε, c+ ε) for every (τ1, τ0) ∈ T . It thus remains to be shown that
one can construct a distribution of (Ỹ (1), Ỹ (0)) given (D̃+, D̃−, X̃, M̃) that is compatible
with our assumptions, and such that the distribution of Ỹ given (D̃, X̃) for X̃ ∈ (c− ε, c+ ε)
is the same as the distribution of Y given (D,X) for X ∈ (c− ε, c+ ε) for every (τ1, τ0) ∈ T .
But this is possible by setting (Ỹ (1), Ỹ (0)) as independent of (D̃+, D̃−, X̃, M̃), and then
assigning one of the respective extreme distributions derived in the main body of the text to
the respective marginals. This completes our proof.
B. Additional Notation for Estimation and Inference
In this section, we give further details on the construction of the estimators and confidence
intervals described in the main body of the paper. To simplify the exposition, we use the
same polynomial order p, bandwidth h and kernel function K(·) in all intermediate estimation
steps in this paper. We also use the notation that πp(x) = (1/0!, x/1!, x2/2!, . . . , xp/p!)′ and
Kh(x) = K(x/h)/h for any x ∈ R, and define the (p+ 1)-vector e1 = (1, 0, . . . , 0)′. The data
are an independent sample {(Yi, Di, Xi), i = 1, . . . , n} of size n.
Following the result in Lemma 1, estimating τ requires estimates of the right and left
limits of the density at the cutoff. There are a number of nonparametric estimators that
can be used to estimate densities at boundary points; see for example Lejeune and Sarda
(1992), Jones (1993), Cheng (1997) or Cattaneo, Jansson, and Ma (2019). Here we use a
minor variation of the procedure in Cheng (1997), which also forms the basis for the McCrary
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(2008) test, and estimate fX(c+) and fX(c−) by
f̂+ = e′1 argmin
β∈Rp+1
n∑
i=1
(f̂(Xi)− πp(Xi − c)′β)2Kh(Xi − c)I {Xi ≥ c} , and
f̂− = e′1 argmin
β∈Rp+1
n∑
i=1
(f̂(Xi)− πp(Xi − c)′β)2Kh(Xi − c)I {Xi < c} ,
respectively, where f̂(Xi) = (1/n)
∑n
j=1 Kh(Xj −Xi). Since by assumption the proportion of
always-assigned units among units just to the right of the cutoff has to be non-negative, our
estimate of τ is then given by
τ̂ = max{τ̃ , 0}, with τ̃ = 1− f̂−/f̂+.
Local polynomial regression estimates of g+ = E(Di|Xi = c+) and g− = E(Di|Xi = c−),
the conditional treatment probabilities on either side of the cutoff, are given by
ĝ+ = e′1 argmin
β∈Rp+1
n∑
i=1
(Di − πp(Xi − c)′β)2Kh(Xi − c)I {Xi ≥ c} , and
ĝ− = e′1 argmin
β∈Rp+1
n∑
i=1
(Di − πp(Xi − c)′β)2Kh(Xi − c)I {Xi < c} ,
respectively (Fan and Gijbels, 1996). The conditional c.d.f.s FY |X=c+,D=d(y) and FY |X=c−,D=d(y)
are estimated by
F̂Y |X=c+,D=d(y) = e′1 argmin
β∈Rp+1
n∑
i=1
(I {Yi ≤ y} − πp(Xi − c)′β)2Kh(Xi − c)I {Xi ≥ c} , and
F̂Y |X=c−,D=d(y) = e′1 argmin
β∈Rp+1
n∑
i=1
(I {Yi ≤ y} − πp(Xi − c)′β)2Kh(Xi − c)I {Xi < c} ,
respectively, which for every y ∈ R corresponds to a local polynomial regression with
I {Yi ≤ y} as the dependent variable (Hall, Wolff, and Yao, 1999). We then estimate the
conditional p.d.f.s fY |X=c+,D=d(y) and fY |X=c−,D=d(y) by
f̂Y |X=c+,D=d(y) = e′1 argmin
β∈Rp+1
n∑
i=1
(Kh(Yi − y)− πp(Xi − c)′β)2Kh(Xi − c)I {Xi ≥ c} , and
f̂Y |X=c−,D=d(y) = e′1 argmin
β∈Rp+1
n∑
i=1
(Kh(Yi − y)− πp(Xi − c)′β)2Kh(Xi − c)I {Xi < c}
respectively, which for every y ∈ R corresponds to a local polynomial regression withKh(Yi−y)
as the dependent variable (Fan, Yao, and Tong, 1996).
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Next, we put
F̂U1 (y, t1, t0) =
(1− κ̂1)Ĝ(y)− t1
1− κ̂1 − t1
· I
{
y ≥ Ĝ−1
(
t1
1− κ̂1
)}
,
F̂U0 (y, t1, t0) =
F̂Y |X=c−,D=0(y)− κ̂0 · (1− t0)F̂LY (0)|X=c,N0(y, t0)
1− κ̂0 · (1− t0)
,
and define the functions F̂L1 and F̂L0 analogously. We use the notation that
Ĝ(y) =
F̂Y |X=c+,D=1(y)− κ̂1F̂Y |X=c−,D=1(y)
1− κ̂1
,
F̂LY (0)|X=c,N0(y, t0) =
∫ y
−∞
ŝ(u, t0)I {u ≥ q̂L(t0)} du,
ŝ(y, t0) =
min
{
f̂Y |X=c−,D=0(y)/κ̂0, f̂Y |X=c+,D=0(y)
}
1− t0
,
κ̂1 =
(1− τ̂)ĝ−
ĝ+
, κ̂0 =
1− ĝ+
(1− τ̂)(1− ĝ−) ;
with q̂L(t0) the value that satisfies
∫ q̂L(t0)
−∞ ŝ(y, t0)dy = 1. Finally, we define the functions
η̂d(t) = τ̂Ld + t · (τ̂Ud − τ̂Ld ), d ∈ {0, 1},
where for j ∈ {U,L} and d ∈ {0, 1} the term τ̂ jd is the obvious sample analogue estimator of
the point τ jd introduced above.
We now introduce notation and details regarding the construction of confidence intervals.
The confidence interval CFRD1−α is constructed using a bootstrap distribution under which the
bootstrap analogue of τ̃ = 1 − f̂−/f̂+ is centered around max{τ̂ , κnσ̂τ̃}, where σ̂τ̃ is the
standard error of τ̃ , and κn is a sequence of constants that slowly tends to infinity. Following
much of the moment inequality literature, we choose κn = log(n)1/2. The algorithm for our
bootstrap is as follows.
1. Generate bootstrap samples {Yi,b, Di,b, Xi,b}ni=1, b = 1, . . . , B by sampling with replace-
ment from the original data {Yi, Di, Xi}ni=1; for some large integer B.
2. Calculate τ̃ ∗b = 1− f̂−b /f̂+b , and put σ̂τ̃ as the sample standard deviation of {τ̃ ∗b }Bb=1.
3. Calculate τ̃b = τ̃ ∗b − τ̃ + max{τ̂ , κnσ̂τ̃} and τ̂b = max{τ̃b, 0}.
4. For j ∈ {U,L}, calculate Γ̂j(η̂1(t), η̂0(t)) using the redefined estimate τ̂b from the
previous step, and put σ̂j(t) as the sample standard deviation of {Γ̂j(η̂1(t), η̂0(t)}Bb=1.
Now define Γ̂L∗(t) and Γ̂U∗(t) exactly as Γ̂L(η̂1(t), η̂0(t)) and Γ̂U(η̂1(t), η̂0(t)), with the excep-
tion that τ̂ ∗ = max{τ̃ , κnσ̂τ̃} is used instead of τ̂ . Following Imbens and Manski (2004) and
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Stoye (2009), our “fixed t” confidence interval for Γ with level 1− α is then given by
CFRD1−α (t) =
[
Γ̂L∗(t)− rα(t) · σ̂L(t), Γ̂U∗(t) + rα(t) · σ̂U(t)
]
,
where rα(t) is the value that solves the equation
Φ
(
rα(t) +
Γ̂U∗(t)− Γ̂L∗(t)
max{σ̂L(t), σ̂U(t)}
)
− Φ(−rα(t)) = 1− α,
and Φ(·) is the CDF of the standard normal distribution. The final intersection-union
confidence interval for Γ is then given by
CFRD1−α =
[
inf
t∈[0,1]
(
Γ̂L(t)− rα(t) · σ̂L(t)
)
, sup
t∈[0,1]
(
Γ̂U(t) + rα(t) · σ̂U(t)
)]
.
Note that this construction does not account for discontinuities in the limiting distribution
of the “fixed t” estimates at those values of τ under which one of the various max and min
operators in the definition of the function ηd(·) becomes binding. We expect this to have only
minor importance in practice, and therefore do not include any “safeguards” against such
cases into our procedure. Our construction also implicitly assumes that the two functions
involved in the definition of the term s(y, τ0) cross at a finite number of points. If that was
not the case the presence of the max operator would generate a bias, which could be removed
using techniques analogous to those in Anderson, Linton, and Whang (2012).
The confidence interval C1−α(τ ∗) can be calculated through the following modified boot-
strap algorithm:
1. For τ ∗ ∈ [0, 1] and t ∈ [0, 1], define Γ̂L(τ ∗, t) and Γ̂U(τ ∗, t) exactly as Γ̂L(η̂1(t), η̂0(t))
and Γ̂U(η̂1(t), η̂0(t)), with the exception that τ ∗ is used instead of τ̂ .
2. Generate bootstrap samples {Yi,b, Di,b, Xi,b}ni=1, b = 1, . . . , B by sampling with replace-
ment from the original data {Yi, Di, Xi}ni=1; for some large integer B.
3. For j ∈ {U,L}, calculate Γ̂jb(τ ∗, t), and put σ̂j(τ ∗, t) as the sample standard deviation
of {Γ̂jb(τ ∗, t)}Bb=1.
4. Compute the 1− α confidence interval CFRD1−α (τ ∗) as[
inf
t∈[0,1]
(
Γ̂L(τ ∗, t)− rα(τ ∗, t) · σ̂L(τ ∗, t)
)
, sup
t∈[0,1]
(
Γ̂U(τ ∗, t) + rα(τ ∗, t) · σ̂U(τ ∗, t)
)]
,
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where rα(τ ∗, t) is the value that solves the equation
Φ
(
rα(τ ∗, t) +
Γ̂U(τ ∗, t)− Γ̂L(τ ∗, t)
max{σ̂L(τ ∗, t), σ̂U(τ ∗, t)}
)
− Φ(−rα(τ ∗, t)) = 1− α.
For τ ∗ = 0 this algorithm yields the usual “no manipulation” confidence interval, and generally
C1−α(τ ∗) becomes wider as τ ∗ increases.
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